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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

----------------------------------------SALLY M. MARTINEZ and the STATE OF
UTAH, by and through Utah State
Department of Social Services,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

No.

14573

.

-v-

'-

EUGENIO MAX ROMERO,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

Appeal from an Order of Dismissal of the
Third Judicial District Court in a~d for
Salt Lake County, the Honorable Bryant·a.
Croft, presiding.
~
.

-------------------------------~-·-~-~~ ....

236 State
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Attorneys ~for.
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondent
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Ill THE SUPREME COURI' Cf' TIIB STATE OF UTAH

---------

~-~-----~----------~-----

Si\LLY M. :•IA.ZfiliEZ and the STATE OF
UTAH, by ilTU through UTJ\J-1 STATE
DEPAR'IMBn' OF SOCIAL SERVICES,

Plain':i£fs and Appellants,

No. 14573

- v -

EUGENIO rlAX

PD'·~,

De':en::1ant arrl Resi:ondent.

BRITE' OF APPELLANTS

-"'=llants, State cf S':a..'1 and Sally M. Martinez, appeal fran
an orce::- ::-,_-__ ::.:-ffi against appella.r,ts in the District Court of the Third
Judicial
i·lotion to

'.::'::_:o~ict,

::;:;_~iss

Salt rake County, State of Utah, granting resi:ondent's
and thereby barring any action to establish paternity

of co-plaiz:tif f's minor child.
DISPOSITION r:J THE IDl'JER COURI'
Following the filing and serving of the canplaint to initiate
paternity proceedings, the court diS!'1issed the action based on defendunt' s clai.rr. that the statute of liinitations

had run.

The =urt held

that a paternity action was controlled by Utah OX!e Annotated 78-12-22.
RELIEF SOUGP.T ON APPEAL

Appellants seek reversal of the

lower =urt' s order and

r:im:orandUl'l decision holding that t..h.e establishment of paternity and the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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liability to supr:ort does not exist wlless the action is carmence:l withir.
eight years and request that this case be ranande:l and the canplaint
reinstatai so as to pennit the processes of the court action to take
place.
STATEMENI' OF FACTS

The co-plainti£f, Sally M. Martinez, gave birth to a child
out of wailock on January 25, 1968.

Co-plaintiff and defendant, Eugenio

Max Ronero, were not married at the time of birth or conception of the

child and defendant has refused to acknowle:lge said child as his own.
The State of Utah and Sally M. Martinez filed a canplaint
against the defendant on the 27th day of January, 1976, allegi.rq tbat
the defendant was the father of co-plainti£f' s illegitimate child and,
as such, was to be declare:l the legal and natural father of the child
and was liable for t.1-ie reasonable expenses of pregnancy and confinenent

of co-plainti£f and the education and necessary supr:ort of said child
by virtue of Utah Code Annotatoo 78-45a-l (1953, as amended 1965).

The

State seeks judgment against the defendant in the amount of Four Thousand One Hundred Dollars ( $4, 100. 00)

for the aforE!llentioned expenses

which were provided for co-plainti£f and her minor child fran February,
1972, through January, 1976, by the Social Services Department, and
that the deferrlant also be ordered to pay the amoW1t of Seventy-five
Dollars ( $7 5. 00) per month as reasonable support artl maintenance for
the child.
This case came before the court on defen::lant' s motion to dismiss.

After taking the matter under advisffilent, the court rule:l that Utah

Code Ann. 78-12-22 controlled all actions for the establishnent of
paternity.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
A FATHER O\!ES THE SAME DUTY OF SUPPORT TO
BOTH LEGI7IMATE AND ILLEGITH!ATE CHILDREN.

At common law a bastard was said to be "filius nullius,"
the child of nobody, or "filius populi," the child of the people.
In essence, the illegitimate child had no father known to the
laH.

"Illegitimacy was considered disgraceful, and a bastard

was disqc.a.lified from certain offices."

10 Am. Jur. 2d 848-849.

Most sta-:es have since mitigated more or less the rigors of
the -:::::-:- _- :_'-'-w and conferreC. upon illegitimate children rights
wh~=~

= _-

-~~previously

denied .

.'I::iijo v. i·:esselius, 73 i·Jash. 2d 716, 440 P.2d
the court held that the words "child or children"
in a

wro~;=ul

death statute meant that the death action was

for the tenefit of decedent's wife, husband, "child or children" which included illegitiJnate as well as legitimate children of deceased parents:
"The reason for this trend is clear.

Society is

becoming progressively more aware that children deserve proper
care, comfort and protection even if they are illegitimate.
The burden of illegitimacy in purely social relationships
should be enough, without society adding unnecessarily to the
burden with legal implications having to do with the care,
health, and \•1elfare of children."
-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Utah law is clearly in line with the modern
trend which recognizes that all children need and deserve
proper care.

Under Utah Code Annotated 78-45(a) (1) of the

"Uniform Act on Paternity," the father is liable"

to

the same extent as the father of a child born in wedlock
. for the education".
of the child."

and "necessary support . .

In further clarifying the exact meaning

of the above cited statute, one must turn to the companion
statutes to understand the intent of the law.
Annotated 78-45-3 states:

Utah Code

"Every man shall support his wife

and his child." (Emphasis added.)

"Child," as defined under

Section 78-45-2(4), "means a son or daughter under the
age of twenty-one years and a son or daughter of whatever
age who is incapacitated from earning a living and without
sufficient means." (Emphasis added.)
Even before the enactment of the above quoted statutes, this court has long recognized the absolute nature
of the father's support duty:

a father has "a positive

duty to support his minor child."
P.2d 262, 107 U. 239 (1944).

Jenkins v. Jenkins, 153

In Rockwood v. Rockwood, 236

P. 457, 65 U. 261 (1925), this court stated that "the duty
of the father to support his children, if he is able to do
so, is imposed in this state by positive statute.

It

would be his duty in any event if there were no statute upon

-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the subject."

In a more recent case, Rees v. Archibald,

6 Utah 2d 264, 311 P.2d 788

(1957), this court said:

"This court has invariably emphasized
the father's obligation to support his
children based upon the elementary principle that the law imposes upon those who
bring children into the world the duty to
care for and support them during their
minority and dependency." (Emphasis added.)
Given the continuing nature of a father's duty of
support and the legislative grant of equal rights to educatio!'. a:--,c :--.c:cessary support to all children (78-45a-l, supra)
it

~~

~~~~~:ul

that the legislature intended that the rights

:itioate child to such support should forever be
bar::_

! because an ac~ion has not been brought within

ei;:--.;::

as held by the lm:er court.

illegit~~~~~

to that c:

The right of the

child to be s~p~orted by its father as opposed

~he

legitimate child would hardly be the same

if abrosa~le by a statute of limitations which runs during
the chil~'s ~inority and bars an action to establish paternity
and enforce the support duty.
POINT II
TO BAR A PATERNITY ACTION BY A CHILD, PARENT,
OR PUBLIC AGENCY DURING THE CHILD'S MINORITY
IS A DENI.l\L OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
JI.ND OF THE RIGETS A;; ILLEGITIMATE CHILD HAS
FOR SUPPORT.
Children born out of wedlock have the sai-ne rights
to support, education, and necessities as those born through
legitimate channels.

The laws of the State of Utah recognize

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-5-

all children whether legitimate or not as equals.

To buy

the position of the lower court does away with this recognition of "equality" and once again places on a child "after
eight years" the stigma of the early common law of being
"filius nullius" if an action has not been brought in that
time period.

To take such a position removes from society

the progress made in the recognition of rights and becomes
overt-rank discrimination against a child who had no say
in its conception, birth, or early life.

Much too often, a

young child does not know the legal, moral, societal implications until several years beyond what the court has held
is the tLme for the action to commence.
The United States Suprene Court entertained questions on the rights of illegitirl1ate children as compared to
those of legitimate children in Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S.
535, 93 S. Ct. 872 (1973}, and drew the following conclusion
" • • • Once a state posits a
judicially enforceable right on behalf
of children to needed support from their
natural fathers, there is no constitutionally
sufficient justification for denying such
essential right to a child simply because
/the7 natural father has not married /Ehe7
mother, and such denial is a denial of equal
protection."
What are these "judicially enforceable" rights?
First of all, the duty of support was discussed in point one
of this brief.

Rees v. Archibald, supra, specifically spell
-6-
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out this duty as does Utah Code Annotated 78-45a-l and 78-45-1,
et seq.

Further, the Colorado Supreme Court said as stated

in Garvin v. Garvin, 108 Colo. 415, 118 P.2d 768 (1941):
"The primary liability of the father to his minor child always exists during minority." (Emphasis added.)
Need the "judicially enforceable" rights under
Utah law be any clearer to fall under the mandate of Gomez?
No.

There must be equality in the application of the right
The lower court in the case at bar feels other-~~

obvious inequality is seen in this case.

If the

. "stion had been born of a marriage with a "known"
fa'::-.
for

~
:-.2~_:

under

~:-e

.~:::3.

child would be able to call upon that father
support through its entire minority.

:~gic

However,

of the lower court, if the parent, guardian,

public c;c:2:-:cy, or child does not bring an action within eight
years,

the child is forever barred from claiming any familial

relatior.ship to one he could call father.
Vihat the lower cm1rt in effect has done is say
that an illegitimate child has an equal right to its father's
support only where suit has been brought on its behalf
within an eight-year period, whereas the legitimate child's
right to support extends through its entire minority regardless of any attempt to bring suit to enforce the support obligation.

-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The defendant based his motion to dismiss on the
fact that "an essential purpose of the statute of limitation:
is to avoid putting a defending party in an untenable position.

Here, the defendant claims the benefit of the stat-

utes because it is, as a practical matter, impossible for
him to adequately prove a defense. "

Al though there may be

problems in defense, the Supreme Court has nonetheless held
in Gomez, supra, that once the right of support has been
granted "there is no constitutionally sufficient justificatior. for ienying such essential right.
nial

cc~s:i~utes

Such a de-

a "denial of equal protection."

:-.ere is no ir.dication that the legislature intende:
that

~'-,c:::-"

::e any exception to the general rule of support.

Further, ::-.ere problems of evidence would hardly justify discrimination between children when dealing with their essential right to support.

Policy aside, it is the plaintiff

who has the burden of proof and whose task will become increasingly difficult with the passage of time.

Defendant's

apprehension in regard to evidence is not sufficient reason for denying children the right of support from their
natural fathers--not to mention the interests of the state
and its taxpayers.
If the rights of legitimate and illegitimate
children are to be equal, an illegitimate must at all times

-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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during its minority be granted the right to prove paternity
either by iself or through its mother or agency charged with
its care.

Otherwise, the illegitimate child's right to sup-

?Ort depends solely on the diligence of its mother or guardian, whose failure to act would, at an early age, reduce
him to the status of welfare recipient and deny him forever
the right to enjoy the economic benefits and social rights
belonging to its legitimate counterparts.
That a state may not invidiously discriminate
against illegitimate children by denying them substantial
ber-.efits accorded children generally is firmly supported by
case law.

A state may not, for example, create a right

of action in favor of children for the wrongful death of a
parent and exclude illegitil!'.ate children from the benefit
of such a right.
1509

(1968).

Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 88 S. Ct.

Nor may illegitimate children be excluded from

sharing equally with other children in the recovery of workmen's compensation benefits for the death of their parent.
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 92 S. Ct.
1400

(1972).

Where, as in the instant case, a continuing

right to support has been created for all children, a complete bar to action resulting from failure to prove paternity
within eight years discriminates unfairly against illegitimates.

,\s stated by the court in ~Tew Jersey Helfare Rights
-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 622, 93 S. Ct. 1700 (1973):
" . . . imposing disabilities on
the illegitimate child is contrary to the
basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility and wrongdoing."
Thus, this court should not make it more difficult
for illegitimate children to live in our society than i t
already is.

Very few children know the significance of what

this controversy centers around at the age of eight.

There-

fore, not only should this court protect the rights of the
illesiti~a~e

child who had no control over its circumstances

but s:-.c-...:..:. _: ?ermi t the person or agency broad lee-way to use
the

~-=---'°~-e

laws for the benefit of the child.

the

mo~~7~

an

fact

tha~

~~
s~e

illegi~ir.i.ate

Ofttimes,

child becomes incensed at the

has become pregnant and despises the natural

father for many years.

Should this fact be a bar to the

mother bringing an action when she realizes there is some
material and psychological benefit to the child?

To say so

would deny to such children a sacred right of parentage and
would discriminate against them because of something they had
no control over.
POINT III
UTAH CODE AN!TOTATED 78-12-22 IS NO BAR
TO BRINGING PATERNITY ACTIONS, BUT IS
MEANT TO BE A STATUTE OF LIMITATIO:: FOR
ENFORCEMENT OF ESTABLISHED COURT ORDERS
OF SUPPORT.
-10-
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The

lo~er

court, in its minute entry as well as

in the final order signed, based the dismissal on the belief that Utah Code Annotated 78-12-22 (as amended) controlled
paternity actions.

The pertinent language is as follows:

"--Within eight years:
An action upon a judgment or decree
of any court of the United States, or of
any state or territory within the United
States.
An action to enforce any liability
due or to become due, for failure to provide support or maintenance for dependent
children." (Emphasis added.)
The IY.irpose of the abo·:e statute, as seen by the
appellants, is not to

co~pletely

bar the bringing of a

paternity actior. to "establish fa-:iilial relationships" but
limits only an obliger's liability for support up to eight
years after a sum certain has been ordered or decreed.

The

statute must be read in light of the intent of the law--to
allow s11pport for dependents.

The language "liability due

or to beco;ne due" was added in 1975 to codify the position
this court took in Seely v. Park, 532 P.2d 684 (Utah, 1975).
In that case, the mother was awarded custody of a minor
child and defendant was ordered to pay $40 per month for
its support.

The defendant failed to abide by the support

order and a subsequent action to enforce the order was
initiated by the woman.

His arrearage was S5,800 for

twelve years and one month.

Although no action was brought
-11-
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within eight years, this court did not hold that the chiN
had lost all right to enforcement of that liability upon
the amount which was due or to become due; instead, the
court held that defendant's liability on the arrearage was
limited to arrearages accumulated within a period of eight
years--i.e., $3,840

(96 x $40).

The court in Seely, Id., quoted Simmons v. Simmons,
105 Utah 574, 144 P.2d 528

(1943), as follows:

"When a judgment is rendered, payable
in installments, the statute begins to run
against the judgment from the time fixed
:8r the payment of each installment for the
:::.rt then payable." (Emphasis added.)
The a::c··,, _ l:1guage demonstrates that the application of Utah
Code
force

~.:.:.:.-:

.-:eC'. 78-12-22 is limited to actions brought to en-

jui~~e:-its,

orders, or decrees of the court that fix

sum certain amounts for support.

Failure to bring an action

on this liability due or to become due does not totally
eliminate a minor's right to receive support payments from
its father.

Instead, it serves to limit the liability due

to an eight year period.

Thus, a minor would not be barred

from bringing an action beyond the eight year period but
would be barred from collecting the amounts due beyond the
statutory limitation.
Appellants are quick to point out, however, thatci
eight year statute does not control support obligations in
paternity matters.

The Uniform Paternity Act has specific

provision for limitation of reimbursement of necessary
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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expenses before the date paternity is established.

The

eight year statute of limitation on liability would not begin
to run until the liability is fixed by court order.

Until

then, the shorter statute of four years preceding the action controls.

Utah Code Annotated 78-45a-3 states:

"--The father's liabilities for past
education and necessary support are limited
to a period of four years next preceding
the commencement of an action." (Emphasis
added.)
It would seem only logical from the above language
that actions for support can be brought beyond the four years
"next preceding" the corcnencer\ent of the action.
the phraseology would be neaningless.
Utah Code Annotated

78-1~-22.

amounts due on sums certain.

~cat

Otherwise,

The sane applies to

language limits only the

Since the Paternity Act con-

trols the collection of necessities, limiting it to four
years, the thrust of both statutes is to leave entirely
alone the matter of "when" a paternity action can be brought.
The opinion of the lower court which denie-s the
natural mother, public agency obligated to provide its care,
and the child itself to bring actions after an eight year
period has gone by does not align itself with Utah law which
provides that support goes until age 21.

The Maine Supreme

Court had a similar situation before it in Earding v.
Skolfield, 125 Me. 438, 134 A. 567
nit.y suit

WilS

(1926).

There, a pater-

filecl when the illegitimate child was 13 years
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old.

The court held the suit to be timely and said the

statute of limitations was no bar to the action because such
an obligation is a continuing one and is not over in the
number of years claimed under the statute of limitations.
This court should take cognizance from the above
case.

Just like the period of liability for support--8

years--is a shifting time period, so is the period for establishing paternity.
to 21.

In the State of Utah, that period goes

Whether the moving party is the child, the woman or

the public agency makes no difference.

The entire purpose

of either of the aforementioned parties bringing an action
is to establish a familial relationship for the child and
have the father of the

c~ild

support it as do the fathers

of children born legitimately.

By prohibiting one of the

above named persons to establish paternity for the benefit
of the child, it is totally inconsistent with the intent and
meaning of the law.

To permit the action secures for the

child social security benefits of the father,
compensation, inheritance, etc.

industrial

To deny this is a judicial

decree declaring that the child "SHALL ALWAYS REMAIN A
BASTARD."
POTIIT IV

ACrIONS TO ESTABLISH PATERNITY ARE NOT CONTROLLED
BY EXISTING STA'IUI'ES OF LINITATIONS. THE A~
ITSELF WAS IURPOSELY SILENT THEREON, AND IT WAS,
THEREFORE, ERROR FOR THE LOHER COURI' TO HOW TEAT
THE ACTION \'JAS SO CONTRJLLED.
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Despite the continuing nature of a father's support
obligation, the defendant argued in the court below th.at "(}'Jn
essenticil prrpose of the starute of limitati ons is to avoid putting
a defending party in an untenable position."

(R. 6)

He further

argued t.hat because no starute of limitations is found in the l::ody
of the Uniform Paternity Act, the four year bastardy limitation was
\~ith

applicable.

this, the defendant rnakes two false assumptions.

First, he falsely assur:les that the civil action to establish paternity

:.3

r;a:=-"'ed by a.ny statute of li-nitations.

assc:-c.3 ':..°c.-:.

c.:~

Secondly, he falsely

limitation urrler tr..e bastardy statute applies to the

Uni:::~-

-.:-cugh deferrlar.t does r.ave a legitimate concern regarding
his

c~-"=~-'°-c.

_-:2

:nere passage o: years goes to the weight of the evi-

de:-.ce :;_"xi :-.:.:o-:., as in most cases, be :::-esolved by judge ari.d jury.
viously,

t:~e

Ob-

bnger a plaintiff's delay, the more difficult his burden

of proof »;il2. beccne.

A55 statErl by the court in Ortega v. Portales,

134 Colo. 5J7, 307 P.2d 193 (1957):
"The infant child cannot be deprived of
its right to continued parental care and support
by failure on the part of any person to act within
a limited time following its birth. The lapse of
time may add to the difficulties of proof concerning the essential facts upon which liability may
depend, but this does not mean that the pertinent
facts cannot be judicially determinErl."
In regard to defendant's first false assumption, the role

of Utah cede Annotated 78-12-22 has already been discussed.

A55 indi-

cettcd in that discussion ill1d alludErl to here, the Uniform Act on
Paternity contains

rD

specific limitation period.

!!ad tl:e state
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le:rislature intena.ed to place a time limitation up::m the bringing of
such an action, it would ha.ve speci£ically so provided.

Since the

primary µirpose of a paternity proceeding is to secure the supIXJrt
ani aiucation of the child rather than to µmish the father, it only

follows that the legislative intent was to ensure that the child \-.Duld
have the right to support during its entire minority.
This court said, in

been recognized in Utah case law.

This has long
Roc~...cx:xi

v.

Rockw:xxi, supra:

"The duty of the father to support his
children • . . is irrrposed in this state by
positive statute. It wJuld be his duty in any
event i£ there were no statute upon the subject."
And, in Rees

v. Archibald, su=a:

"This court has invariably emprasized the
father's obligaticn to support his children based
u:t:x:m the elementary principle trat the law imposes
upon trose whJ bri.'1g childre.11 into the 'M:lrld the
duty to care for and support than during their
minority an:l dependency."
In Rees, Id., this court held that a divorce decree did

not affect the deferrlant' s responsibility for his son's support and the
expenses of care given him.

In arriving at this holding, the court

chose that rule of law which gave

11

•••

the rights and needs of the children. 11

pr:irrary consideration to

Thus, Utah law appears to

follow the rule that the obligation of a father to support his child,
le;Jit:imate or ille:ritimate, is continuing and terminates only when the
child reaches its majority illlder a provision of the divorce decree or
paternity order, or 21 years under Utah Code Annotated 78-45-1, et
seq., i£ the decrees or orders are silent or i£ there are no orders.
To apply a statute of limitations not speci£i cally provided for by
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escape bis continuing obligation to support "his" child i£ his child
it

11

is.

11

10 f.m. Jur. Trials 678-679 discusses the J:astardy stabltes
and the evolution of the fact that the Uni£orm Act on Paternity had no
limitations.

In that discussion is found a definitive statement regard-

ing the lack of a statute of l~llitations under tb.e Uni£orm Paternity

Act:
"Th.e original J:astardy statutes, creating a new
cause of action, usually established a speci£ic and
c;..:ite short period of tiTce within which the action
:::culd be brought. In most cases the running of the
:::'2.tute started with the birth of the child, and the
c:=ion by the mother r.ad to be brought within a per-,_: of fran one to th!:ee years. Some statutes stipu-:=.-rl that an actior: could be brought by the local
_-:cy when the cl-J.lc: ,,as or was likely to became a
.: ::..ic charge. If t..':ere "-aS any limitation on the
:. z:gir.g of such ac+-;oz:, the statute usually did rot
::.. -:::; in to run until the c::-:ild did becane a p.iblic
::::-..:.rge.

Usually the stab.lte was tolled by written acknowle::l::;ment of paternity or by the furnishing of support.
S-ie written acknowledgmerit must have been unequivocal
ar.d the payment of support reasonably regular, not
merely sporadic.
Many i f not all of the state laws continue to
reflect such provisions. Eowever, as the views of
society in respect to the responsibility of the
father changed,
after statutes were enacted rrak.inq it a crime for the father wilfully to fail to
support an illegitimate child, the theor'( evolved
that each day's failure to support constib.lted a new
crime; thus, for all practical pirposes the statute
,,uuld never run.

ana

This view is also reflected in some of the modern
p:i.ternity statutes. The Uniforr;i Paternity Act has no
limitations on bringing the action, but recovery can be
had only for the ne:::essa,..ry support supplied during the
four years next precedi..ng the ccmnencanent of the action. 11
(Dnphasis added. )
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Thus, for something ro important, l::asic, and sa=e:J. as
the establishnent of fEternity, none of the existing "general" stat-

____

The act itself, as indicated in Fro. Jur. Trials ,

utes do or can apply.

Id., specifically delete:] the limitation because the drafters of that
law recognizerl this inherent right of the illB.Jitb1ate.
This rrore enlightenerl view which canports with the policy
of Utah law giving " .

primary consideration to the rights and

neerls of the children" has long been applie:J. in other jurisdictions.
In State of A.lab3rna. v. Hunter, 67 Ala. 81 (1880), a l::astardy proceerl-

ing Y.rereir. rn specific statutory limitation had been prescribed in
the bastz:::--.2:·

~...atute

itself, the court staterl:

"We can see gocxi reasons why no statute
limitations was prescribed to l::ar such procee:J.-·c;s. They are chiC::ly interrlerl for the public
.:..:.aennity, and to coerce the p_ltative father to
~-~~rt and maintair. the unforb.mate child."
In State v. Cordrey, 49 Del. 281, 114 A.2d 805 (1955), the father was

charge:J. with failure to support his illB.Jitimate child.

The court

recognizerl non-support as a continuing crime:

"
The def errlant in this case is
charged with non-support which the law recognizes
as a continuing crime. In crimes of this nature,
the stablte does not begin to run fran the occurrence of the initial act, which may in itself anl:x:rly all the elements of the =ime, but fran the
occurrence of the most recent act. The duty to
support the child is a contin uing duty and
the failure to support it is a continuing offense,
and the parent will be subject to prosecution at
any time during the continuance of the wilful
ne.Jlect to support the cJ1ild as provided by the
Statute. II
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A 1ciore recent case, State v. Christensen, 19 Ariz.
App. 479, 508 P.2d 366 (1973), held that a one year statute of limitations on actions on liability created by statute did not bar an
action by the mother against the alleged father which was brought
b-10

yea.rs after the child's birth to determine paternity and canpel
The Arizona court followed the policy enrmciated in State

support.
v.

i~erini,

61 Ariz. 503, 151 P.2d 983 (1944), where, after observing

trat the bastardy article did not contain sections limiting the time
in which the proceedings might be instituted, the court carrnented:
"The statute is entirely free fran any
bar of this kind, arid indeed there should not be,
for the o!Jligation of a father to support his child,
whether legiti..'t'ate er illegitirrate, is a continuing
duty against which lir.titatio:-i will not rrm during
the t.ir:te the child r.eeds such care and support. We
c~'1!10t conceive tr.at the legislature ever intended
to l:i.rri t the tir.e Li. \·ihich su:::h proceedings could
be instituted and .t_::rosecuted."
Arrl, in State v. Johnson, 216

~!inn.

427, 13 N.W.2d 26 (1944):

"The rule that the statute of limitations does
not rrm until the liability has ceased to a:mtinue
rests upon the principle that where the obligation
is continuing in nature the breach or violation of
duty continues so long as the obligation continues,
and that the cause of action or penalty, as the case
may be, must be deemed to be continually accruing
during t.c':e entire time the obligation and the breach
thereof continue."
Regarding the second false assurrption, not as much need be
said.

Utah Code Ar.notated 77-60-15 is a limitation of bastardy pro-

ceedings to 4 years.

I t says:

"No prosecution under this Chapter ffestardff
shall be brought after four years fran the birth of
such child . . . " (Emphasis and Brackets aaded. )
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The defendant himself in his Motion to Disniss (R. 5) states:

"This

provision is l.imited to the chapter on J::astardy."
If the legislature had meant for the four year st2tute
to apply to the Unifonn Paternity Act, it v:ould have so indicated.
Furthennore, the more recent act, a Uniform Act, 'MJuld not likely be
circumscribErl by a state J::astardy statute originally passed in 1911.
Also, Section 78-45a-3 would be rendered meaningless i f the four year
statute were to govern.

The language "conmencement of an action" with

a liability l.imitation of four years thereon strongly implies that more
than one action could be brought--this being so, application of the four-

year statute \o.U.lld be incongruous.
surely, i f the legislature ar.d the authors of the Unifo:an
Pate..."'Ility Act had wanted to li.--:tit the tir..e withi.'1 which paternity could
be establisherl either by the act itself or through use of the Bastardy

Act, they would have so provided.

A matter of such importance v.ould

not have been deleted without a good reason-that reason being that the
basic rights of all children and the duty of fathers to provide for

their support should not be subject to arbitrary, unjust l.imitations
which wuld bar the child fran exercising its rights to parental establishnent.

POil-IT V
IF ANY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS FOOND 'ID
CON'IROL, SAID LIMITATION IS TOLLED DURTh"G THE
CHILD'S MThDRITY AND AN N::r ION BROUGHT DURlliG
THE MINORITY OF THE CHILD IS PROPER.
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Srould this court find that the eight year (or any other
length) statute of linitation controls paternity actions, such limitations do not bar the bringing of the action during the child• s
ninority.

\·lhether the mother, child, or p.illlic agency charged with

the child's support initiates and brings the action does not matter.
.e
Th

"r~~
~

l"

~~~ty
~

n rn
· ter es t rn
· a 11 o f the ahJve situations is only one

11·

person--the child.
Utah Code Annotated 78-12-36 (b) (1) makes it clear that
the i.:..-:-i':.3."'.:..:..on period does not run during minority.

The pertinent

la:c-2=2 .:..s ::s follows:
''If a person e..-.titled to bring an action . .
?_t tr_e tirne t_r-i_e CC.'..:Se of action accrued under
a:::-e o~ rrajor.i °'.:.'.' fr_o tici.e of su::h disabilit)'.is
-. " = t of t.'le ti-:-.e 1 iznited for the comnencanent
~~e 2ction . "
(~:i.a.sis addeCi.)

µesent action fits '.:his category exactly.

The child

1,-as eight: ':=s and b..u days old when the ac ti.on was filed.
res 10 years renaining for its minority.

The child

Pursuant to the ahJve stat-

ute, the l~-:titation of tiTJ'.e is tolled until majority is reached.

lbw-

ever, in analysis of the foregoing, it is called to the court's attention t.'1at Ctah Code f\.r_riotated 78-45a.-2 allows the mother, p.illlic
age..--cy, or child to bring the action in its own name, or together.

In

connection therewith, the child has a right to bring the action ard,
thus, by the language of 78-12-36 (b) (1), the period is tolled.
The argument undoubtedly will be raised that the suit is
brought in the name of the state ard the mother and not that of the
child.

Therefore, since neither the state nor the mother are in their

rninority, the statute of limitations should run.

Appellants WJuld like
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to resµ:md to this in the following manner:
If this court agrees with the al:xJve provision, the mother

could petition the court to be appcinted guardian-ad-litan.

In. essence,

she is doing now in her own name the same thing she v.:ould do as a
"guardian-ad-litan," which is to pursue the interests of the child.
Further, as indicated previously, the "real" party, no matter wrose
name appears on the title of the action, is the "child" and not the
mother or the State of Utah.

Of course, the State would benefit

financially because of the fact that an established paternity w:iuld
permit collection of supp'.)rt fran the natural father when the child is
on \\elfare.

nowever, the greater benefit derived directly by the

child greatly outv.-eighs the fev dollars collected for \\elfare reirn-

l:ursenent.
The California S\...'PrEme Court, in Van Buskirk v. Tedd, 269
Cal. App. 2d 680, 75 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1969), followed appellant's
position, arove.

In that case, the mother of an illegitimate child

initiate:J. an action to determine paternity through a bastardy action.
The court held that a bastardy action should be considered fran the

standpoint of the child as the real party in interest, and that the
statute of limitations in the paternity phase of such an action is
tolled at all times from the birth of the child until his wajority,
or until an action for paternity is brought on his behalf.

The

court also stated that the tolling of the statute during the minority
of the child in question was not terminated by the bringing of an
earlier paternity-support action which was voluntarily dismissed by

-22-
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the child's representative.

The court analogized the instant case

to one in which a guardian ad liteu voluntarily discontinues an
action brought on behalf of an infant, and where the general rule is
that the rights of ti',e infant are not prejudicErl thereby, and that
he may still take advantage of his disability, the action not being

barred until the lapse of the statutory pericrl after he ba::anes of
age.
Further, the same court reiterated its position in 1971
when it decided Perez v. Singh, 21 Cal. App. 3d 870, 97 Cal. Rptr.
920 (1971).

An attanpt to rave the paternity action defeated by

lac'.'.23 1-1as there encountered by the court.

The court said that in an

act.:.c;-i to establish the paternity of an illegitirl'ate child and to obtain su_'.)pcrt for that child, c:-ought by the mother on behalf of the
chilc, the child is the real :rarty in interest, and the statute of
limitations on the paternity aspect of the case is tolled during
the runority of the child.

The court stated that the obligation

of a fat.her to sui:p::irt his child, whether legitimate or illegitirrate, is a continuing duty against which th e statute of limitations
does rot run during the tirre that the child needs such support.
The ccurt felt that the result v.uuld be no different if the canplaint
1:as inc'.eErl considered to raise equitable issues, since the action
1·.ould be brought on the child's behalf, all benefits derived fran
it 1-.ould belong to the child, and therefore laches could not be
irnp.ltm to the child during its minority.
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Appellants conterrl that the two preceding California cases
present the law this court should follow.

Since the right to support

does belong to the child and could, under the

l~

court rulin::r,

forever be lost through no fault of his own at the age of eight years,
the action should be considered fran the standpoint of the child as the
real party in interest.

Mlere, as in the instant case, the person is

affected by a recognized legal disability and a continuing duty of
supµ:irt exists, the interests of the child and society must not be
limited by an arbitrary imposition of statutory limitation during a
child I 5 nir.c:::-i ty •
c::N:T...lJSICN
--., .interests of illegi ti-nate children should be of great
conce..-rn o:'

curs, tbe

~-~3

court.

~'.:.l.ral

In a d.3.y arrl age \·lhere more illegitimacy oc-

fathers who indiscriminately feel sex is a play

toy should be required to support those children they bring into the
\IOrld.

To i;:rohibit this fran taking place, the taxpayers of this

state will be called upon to support rrore and more children "wh:lse
fathers can hide behirrl the technical cloak of the law. "
It is appellants' position that the low"Err court must be
reversed and the complaint reinstated so as to allow discovery processes to take place to detel'.TI1ine the actual paternity of the child.
There is nothing more basic to our society than to have that right.
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